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The Logic of Location: Malaria Research in Colonial
India, Darjeeling and Duars, 1900–30
NANDINI BHATTACHARYA*
Abstract: This article explores the scientific and entrepreneurial
incentives for malaria research in the tea plantations of north Bengal
in colonial India. In the process it highlights how the logic of ‘location’
emerged as the central trope through which medical experts, as well as
colonial administrators and planters, defined malaria research in the
region. The paper argues that the ‘local’ emerged as both a prerequisite
of colonial governance as well as a significant component of malaria
research in the field. Despite the ambiguities that such a project
entailed, tropical medicine was enriched from a diverse understanding
of local ecology, habitation, and structural modes of production.
Nevertheless, the locality itself did not benefit from anti-malarial pol-
icy undertaken either by medical experts or the colonial state. This arti-
cle suggests that there was a disjuncture between ‘tropical medicine’
and its ‘field’ that could not be accommodated within the colonial
plantation system.
Keywords: Tropical Medicine; Malaria; Prophylaxis; Anti-Malarial
Sanitation; Tropical Aggregation of Labour; Immunity; Race; Planta-
tion Economy; Anopheles; Species Sanitation; Local Knowledge;
Quinisation; S.R. Christophers.
Introduction
Malaria in colonial India has been linked to the agencies of modernisation. The proble-
matic of colonial ‘development’ leading to the spread of malaria has been located in
terms of disease and political economy. Sheldon Watts and Ira Klein have linked the
increase and spread of malaria in colonial India to the rapid commercialisation of agri-
culture, deforestation, expansion of the railways, construction of embankments, as well
as urbanisation, consequent on the monetisation of the colonial Indian economy in the
nineteenth century.
1 Borrowing from twentieth-century nationalist critiques, historians
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183have identified British development policies as the cause of malaria in colonial Bengal,
but have not critically analysed the medical debates around malaria and development in
colonial Bengal.
2 Klein has studied the relationship between ecology, environmentalism
and malaria in colonial India and has argued that there was a relative decrease in
malaria mortality in Bengal in the mid-twenties, and attributed it to the rise in immu-
nity in the surviving populations in the worst-affected districts of Bengal. The links
between malaria and development are, however, tortuous: Randall Packard has pointed
out that anti-malarial policy and the ‘development’ that followed in the Transvaal bene-
fited large plantation owners and marginalised both small white farmers and African
peasants.
3
Less debated have been the trajectories of malaria research, anti-malarial policy,
and the role of the colonial state and private entrepreneurship in formulating and
directing anti-malarial programmes. It is important to do so because malaria research
was conducted at important sites of colonial economy, such as plantations, port cities,
and cantonments, where malaria threatened economic or military activities. Sustained
anti-malarial initiatives were undertaken in the rubber estates in Malaya, in the coffee
plantations of Ceylon, the large tea plantations of Assam, and at the eastern frontier
during the Second World War.
4 The Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine was sup-
ported almost exclusively by entrepreneurial patronage from planters and miners in
Southeast Asia and West Africa. This paper explores the incentives for medical
research in a tropical colony by analysing malaria research in one such area, the tea
plantations of north Bengal. It demonstrates the duality of locality in colonial malaria
research. The site of research assumed significance as a primary factor both in the
identification of the causation of disease, as well as in the economic concerns of colo-
nialism. Yet, this focus on specific localities in terms of research and economic activ-
ities did not extend to sustained implementation of anti-malarial policies at those very
sites.
The logic of location had wide acceptance within colonial medical and official dis-
course. Historians have established that in the nineteenth century, British Indian medical
officers believed that local conditions in India contributed to a unique disease zone, to
the extent that many rejected bacteriological explanations for cholera.
5 The logic of loca-
tion transcended miasmatic theories of fever and was appropriated within the framework
of tropical medicine, including malaria research in the twentieth century and informed
anti-malarial policy.
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184This logic also became significant in the context of epidemiology. The explorations of
the relationships between vector control and transmission among the mosquito vector,
the parasite, the environment, and the behaviour of human carriers in particular, privi-
leged malaria studies based at the sites of the occurrence of the disease in the ‘field’, a
term used by scientists and anthropologists alike. The influence of environmental factors
on tropical medicine was not just limited to malaria. Research on trypanosomiasis in
Africa also appropriated a complexity of variables including ecology, insect vector, para-
site, and human and animal infection in the inter-war years.
6 The emphasis on environ-
ment and its links with malaria was retained long after the discovery of the insect vector
of the malaria parasite, and medical research linked fevers to localities in fresh terms.
‘Species sanitation’, a term coined by the Dutch researcher N.H. Swellengrebel in
1911 to link carrier anopheline species with specific habitats, enriched the cognitive con-
nection between ecology and malaria research.
7 In India, this cognitive link had particu-
lar resonance, as British Indian sanitary theories had long favoured the uniqueness of
location in medical discourse, particularly with respect to cholera.
8 The logic of
‘location’ appeared in multifarious forms in malaria research. These included local vec-
tors, ecology, demography, race, and culture. As this paper will show, malaria research
in the Darjeeling hills was imbued with the multiple and ambiguous identifications of
the local.
Yet, paradoxically perhaps, malaria research was an international project. In the years
following Ronald Ross’s discovery of the insect-vector factor in malaria (1897), care-
fully selected sites became locations for intensive anti-malarial activity in many parts
of the world. In Italy, a generation of malariologists established research and conducted
anti-malarial sanitation.
9 After the First World War, the League of Nation’s fledgling
Health Committee conducted a series of malaria surveys in several Mediterranean and
Baltic countries, formerly theatres of the War, where malaria mortality had been enor-
mous. Within the British Empire, malaria researchers focused intensely on specific
sites, especially those that were of strategic or economic interest in Africa, India,
Ceylon, and Malaya between 1900 and 1930. The London and Liverpool Schools of
Tropical Medicine provided institutional support to many researchers who travelled to
many parts of the tropical world, and who exchanged research and debated anti-malarial
policies and strategy vigorously in international conferences and medical journals.
Malaria research in India was a part of the international research agenda, often borrow-
ing from, as well as contributing to contemporary international debates. When
J.A. Sinton compiled a bibliography of malaria research in India, he filled two hundred
pages with more than two thousand items from scientific and medical journals.
10 As we
shall see, every local anti-malaria project in India borrowed ideas from contemporary
6See Helen Tilley, ‘Ecologies of Complexity:
Tropical Environments, African Trypanosomiasis,
and the Science of Disease Control Strategies in
British Colonial Africa, 1900–1940’, Osiris, 19
(2004), 21–38.
7D.J. Bradley, ‘Watson, Swellengrebel and
Species Sanitation: Environmental and Ecological
Aspects’, Parassitologia, 36, 1–2 (1994), 137–47.
8Isaacs, op. cit. (note 5).
9F.M. Snowden, The Conquest of Malaria: Italy,
1900–1962 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2006).
10W.F. Bynum, ‘Reasons for Contentment:
Malaria in India, 1900–1920’, Parassitologia, 40,1–2
(1998), 19–27: 21.
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185international research and attempted to utilise them in specific local contexts.
S.R. Christophers, the malariologist who was most influential in conducting research,
benefited from the work of Angelo Celli in the Roman Campagna, as well as from
Robert Koch’s immunity studies on malaria. Within tropical colonies, Malcolm
Watson’s ideas on the flying radius of the anopheles, from Swellengrebel’s work on
‘species sanitation’, targeting the malaria parasite carriers, reinforced control pro-
grammes in India and Ceylon. This juxtaposition between international research and
the influence of local human and environmental factors was the main characteristic of
malaria research in colonial India.
The focus of medical research on malaria was not surprising, for after cholera, it was
the principal cause of mortality in colonial India. It was either constantly prevalent or
periodically erupted in epidemic form: in the nineteenth century and between the
1890s and 1921, it probably took twenty million lives.
11 In the nineteenth century, Ben-
gal suffered particularly: malaria depopulated entire districts, and state public health
policies, and to an extent, popular political movements engaged with its effects.
12 In
the nineteenth century, British Indian medical discourse had relegated malaria-ridden
Indians to racial and civilisational degeneracy, beyond the reforming momentum of Brit-
ish imperialism.
13 Subsequent to the discovery and acceptance of the insect-vector trans-
mission of the disease by Ronald Ross, incremental research in tropical medicine
privileged selected sites for research on the control of malaria. Both local specificities
and international exchange and co-operation were integral aspects of malaria research,
and this paper argues that the paradox of local and international priorities were never
resolved in malaria research.
Disease and Locality: Tropical Medicine and
the Darjeeling Foothills
The tea plantations of north Bengal were privileged sites of economic activity in colonial
India. Large-scale tea plantations were established from 1856 in Terai and Duars, which
were located in the foothills of the Himalayan Darjeeling. In 1900, the combined tea
production of Darjeeling, Terai, and Duars exceeded a quarter of India’s annual tea
export and employed over two hundred thousand workers.
14 The plantations were
reclaimed from forests, reed jungles, and miles of swampy land that had a reputation
for malarial fevers. The region was subsequently subjected to several malaria surveys,
emphasising the importance of ‘location’ within both the colonial economy and medical
research.
Duars and Terai were well known to travellers and soldiers as dank and febrile terri-
tories. In 1866, when the Vicereine Lady Canning stopped in the Terai on her way to
11Klein, op. cit. (note 1).
12Samanta, op. cit. (note 2), 151–77.
13Mark Harrison, ‘“Hot Beds of Disease”: Malaria
and Civilization in Nineteenth-Century British India’,
Parassitologia, 40, 1–2 (1998), 11–18; see also,
David Arnold, ‘“An Ancient Race Outworn”: Malaria
and Race in Colonial India, 1860–1930’, in Waltraud
Ernst and Bernard Harris (eds), Race, Science and
Medicine (London: Routledge, 1999), 123–43.
14Detailed Report of the General Committee of
the Indian Tea Association for the Year 1901,
(Calcutta: W. Newman and Co., 1902), 350–2.
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186Darjeeling, she contracted a fever from which she never recovered.
15 Arthur Story, a
physician employed in the Duars plantation remarked: ‘talk about “darkest Africa”,
I think “darkest Hindustan” is pretty nearly as bad’.
16
With the expansion of the plantation economy, the region was transformed both eco-
logically and demographically. The plantations cleared forests and introduced the flow of
immigrant labour, as well as foreign flora. All of the above changed the ecological and
demographic characteristics of the region. The labourers were recruited from the impo-
verished Santhal Parganas and the Chotanagpur districts of western Bengal through
agents (sardars), who themselves worked in supervisory positions in the plantations. In
north Bengal, unlike in the older established tea plantations in neighbouring Assam,
there was no indentured labour: the labourers were legally free to move. In fact, their
mobility depended on their ability to repay loans they acquired from the planters or their
agents to pay for living expenses. Each community lived in bamboo and thatch huts
(coolie lines), next to its sardars. The tea plantations were generally flanked by villages
(bastis), settled by tenant cultivators who worked in the plantations in the peak season.
Each tea estate also housed a few clerical staff, as well as two to three assistant managers
and the manager, whose bungalow was located at the centre of each estate. The size of
the labouring population within a tea estate varied from three-to-four hundred to two-
to-three thousand in the larger estates.
While Ross’s discovery appeared to promise the elimination of anopheline mosqui-
toes, the dynamic aspects of the locality itself challenged the presumptions of malaria
research. In 1902, the Government of India invited the Malaria Committee of the
Royal Society to India. Its members included J.W.W. Stephens, who had initially
investigated malaria along the Amazon and was a Fellow of the Royal Society,
S.R. Christophers, who later became the Director of the Malaria Bureau of India, and
C. W.W. Daniels representing the Colonial Office.
17 Their Indian tour included the
capital city of Calcutta, the Duars, and the agriculturally important Punjab. Their find-
ings suggested that although anophelines were responsible for the transmission of
malaria, the degree of infection at a given locality was not directly proportional to
the total number of anophelines there. In Calcutta, for instance, they found more ano-
phelines than in ‘the worst fever districts of Africa’.
18 Yet none were found to be
infected with malaria.
19 Whereas in the Duars, there were fewer anophelines but the
incidence of malaria was very high.
20 The report highlighted this factor of locality
15L.S.S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetteer:
Darjeeling (Calcutta: The Bengal Secretariat Book
Depot, 1907), 53.
16A.N.J. Story to his mother, Looksan Tea Estate,
14 August 1892, fo. 321, Mss Photo Eur 275, Asia,
Pacific and Africa Collections [hereafter APAC],
British Library.
17H.E. Shortt and P.C.C. Garnham, ‘Samuel
Rickards Christophers, 27 November 1873–19
February 1978’, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of
the Royal Society, 25 (1979), 179–207; see also
Samuel Rickards Christophers, ‘John William Watson
Stephens, 1865–1946, Obituary Notices of Fellows of
Royal Society, 5 (1947), 524–40; J.W.W. Stephens
later joined the Liverpool School of Tropical
Medicine, see Helen J. Power, Tropical Medicine in
the Twentieth Century: A History of the Liverpool
School of Tropical Medicine, 1898–1990 (London:
Keegan Paul, 1999), 22.
18S.P. James, ‘Malaria In India’, Scientific
Memoirs by Officers of the Medical and Sanitary
Department of the Government Of India, New Series
No. 2 (Calcutta: Periodical Publications, 1902), 76.
19Ibid., 77. See also ‘A Preliminary Report of the
Royal Society Malaria Commission’, Indian Medical
Gazette, 37 (1947), 101–2.
20Ibid.
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187in the phenomenon of ‘anophenilism without malaria’, concluding that specific breed-
ing places and species of anopheline carriers determined the extent of malarial infec-
tion in a locality.
21 Therefore, the first study on malaria in the tea plantations
emphasised the importance of locality in the transmission of the disease, and the Duars
region assumed special significance to malaria research.
Vector as Locality: The Mian Mir Debate
in Colonial India
An early experiment at anti-malarial sanitation was conducted between 1902 and 1909 at
Mian Mir, a military cantonment near Lahore in the Punjab. The study was conducted by
the Malaria Committee of the Royal Society, facilitated by the Government of India and
supervised by Stephens and Christophers. The report concluded that anopheline control
was not feasible in the area. The conclusions at Mian Mir were responsible for the retreat
of anti-malarial sanitation programmes in India through government initiatives for some
time.
22 In official policy and medical discourse, attention shifted towards the human
body as the site of prevention.
Sheldon Watts has pointed out that Christophers, as the chief malariologist in India
until the mid-thirties, kept the focus of anti-malarial policy in India away from the canals
and irrigated rice fields, and instead concentrated on a quinine policy.
23 Watts argued
that direction away from anti-malarial sanitation and towards quinine prophylaxis was
motivated by the need to sustain the irrigation policy of the government in British India,
particularly the canals in the Punjab, from which private investors in England earned rich
dividends and the Government of India reaped the benefits of substantial agricultural
revenue.
The irrigation canals were the basis of the agrarian economy of the British Punjab,
which was commercialised and greatly expanded under British rule. Two-fifths of the
army in colonial India was recruited from the rural peasantry of the Punjab: the loyalty
of this army, especially after the Revolt of 1857, was linked to the prosperity of the
agrarian economy.
24 Moreover, as Ira Klein has pointed out, Watts ignored the various
studies, especially by Bentley, which drew links between ecological degradation and
the incidence of malarial fever in colonial Bengal.
25 But there was more to the evolving
discourse of malaria and the practices of anti- malarial sanitation in India than a simple
dichotomy between the ‘sanitarian’ approach and the ‘scientific one’ of malarial prophy-
laxis through the use of quinine. Most malariologists, led by Christophers, emphasised
21Ronald Ross, who was in the neighbouring
Terai while he was in the IMS, also noticed the great
paucity of anophelines there. Ronald Ross and L.J.
Bruce-Chwatt, The Great Malaria Problem and Its
Solution: From the Memoirs of Ronald Ross (London:
The Keynes Press, 1988), 194.
22For a narrative of the controlled experiments at
Mian Mir and the controversy between Ross and
Christophers, S.P. James and, indeed, almost all of the
Indian medical establishment, see W.F. Bynum, ‘An
Experiment That Failed: Malaria Control at Mian
Mir’, Parassitologia, 36, 1–2, (1994), 107–21.
23Watts, op. cit. (note 1).
24Rajit K. Mazumdar, The Indian Army and the
Making of Punjab (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003).
25Ira Klein, ‘Development and Death:
Reinterpreting Malaria, Economics and Ecology
in British India’, Indian Economic and Social
History Review, 38 (2001), 147–79.
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188the importance of quinisation. But Ross, who battled the Indian Medical Service (IMS)
establishment to focus more on anti-malarial sanitation had also argued that, ‘Before
practical results can be reasonably looked for, however, we must find precisely
(a) what species of Indian mosquito do and do not carry malaria? (b) What are the habits
of dangerous varieties?’
26
Therefore, there was no question of indiscriminate implementation of anti-malarial
sanitation, even by its strongest advocate. It required detailed research into the habits
and breeding places of anopheline mosquitoes, and therefore the question of locality
remained. Between 1902 and 1930, malaria research all over the world, as well as
in India, demonstrated the enormous variety of types, as well as breeding habits of
anopheles, which differed from one terrain to another, making the question of locality
a crucial one. By 1913, still convinced that the destruction of parasite-carrying anopheles
was possible, Ross presented the successes of the campaigns towards total extermination
of malaria in the Panama Canal, in Ismailia in Egypt (near the Suez Canal), and in the
Malay Straits. He did not contemplate large-scale prevention in rural areas of either
Africa or India.
27 Years later, Malcolm Watson would point out that Ross had insisted
that he was ‘misrepresented’ and that he had ‘never thought and certainly never stated
that it would “be possible to exterminate mosquitoes throughout Africa, for instance...
always referred...to large towns”.’
28
In India, Christophers and his colleagues, such as S.P. James and J.A. Sinton, were the
most outspoken partisans of quinine prophylaxis as the best mode to control malaria. The
strategy of quinisation was complicated: authorities disagreed over whether it could be
best used as prophylaxis or as a curative – the supply was far less than the demand for
quinine.
29 The Dutch monopoly over almost ninety percent of the cinchona produced
in the world created problems of access. But the quinisation approach was combined
with sporadic implementation of anti-malarial sanitation as well as segregation – which
were all attempted, in various degrees, in the tea plantations.
30 British Indian malariolo-
gists borrowed theories of transmission and control of malaria from the research con-
ducted in Italy two decades previously, including identifying the ‘human factor’ in
transmission, the use of quinine prophylaxis, and also construction of mechanical screen-
ing. Christophers and Bentley’s work in the Duars opened a new possibility in identify-
ing the causation and the control of the disease: the collective body of labour
congregation in the plantations.
26Malcolm Watson, ‘Malaria and Mosquitoes:
Forty Years On’, Journal of the Royal Society of Arts,
87, 4505 (1939), 485.
27Ronald Ross, ‘Medical Science and the
Tropics’, Bulletin of the American Geographical
Society, 45 (1913), 435–8.
28See Watson, op. cit. (note 26), 483.
29The debate was initiated in Italy between Celli
and Grassi; while the former advocated its use as
prophylaxis, the latter favoured ‘radical cure’ of
patients, by ‘curing all cases’ so that mosquitoes
would not be infected and the cycle of transmission
would break, Snowden, op. cit. (note 9), 50–1.
30The segregation of Europeans from native
quarters to prevent malarial infection was
recommended by the first Royal Society Malaria
Committee: Government of Bengal Proceedings,
Municipal/Medical, No. 26–28 (December 1903),
P/6565, APAC, 200–1. It became a regular practice in
West Africa. See John W. Cell, ‘Anglo-Indian
Medical Theory and the Origins of Segregation in
West Africa’, The American Historical Review, 91
(1986), 307–35.
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189Labour as Location: Malaria Research
in the Duars
In 1906, the British planters in Duars petitioned for a commission to investigate malaria
and blackwater fevers in their locality. The Government of India appointed Christophers
and C.A. Bentley to investigate malaria and blackwater fever in the region.
31 Their report
linked malaria with the structures of the plantation economy and located the disease in
the community of newly immigrant labourers, rather than on local miasmatic influence.
This transformed the question of location. Referring to researches on immunity con-
ducted by Robert Koch and by Angelo Celli (in the Roman Campagna), they asserted
universal links between malaria with congregations of a labouring population:
We may say that in our researches on malaria we have for some time recognised the almost con-
stant association of labour camps with severe malaria.... It is not the soil disturbance, we believe,
but the occurrence of labour camp conditions, or what we shall call for convenience of description
THE TROPICAL AGGREGATION OF LABOUR, in association with these enterprises which has
given them their evil reputation.
32
The ‘tropical aggregation of labour’ or the ‘human factor’ in the transmission of
malaria marked a shift in the significance of location in malaria research. Now the con-
gregative bodies of labourers comprised the location of disease. Although the ‘human
factor’ in malaria that informed the thesis of ‘tropical aggregation of labour’ was pre-
viously described by Koch and Celli, it had particular resonance for immunity studies
in industrial sites in tropical countries. The study linked, for the first time in India, epi-
demiological explanation of malaria to the influx of immigrant labour and the ‘factor of
non-immune migration’ at any industrial site: ports, jute mills, tea gardens, and railway
construction sites.
33 The movement of infected workers made them mobile reservoirs of
malaria.
34 The thesis of the tropical aggregation of labour gained credence through
reiteration in national and international forums. In 1929, the League of Nations Malaria
Committee carried out an inspection tour of India at the invitation of the Government of
India. Christophers wrote the preface to their report. The factor of non-immune immigra-
tion at industrial sites was cited as a major cause of the spread of malaria, particularly
mines, plantations, and ports.
35
31Government of Bengal, Municipal/Sanitation
Proceedings Volume, B Proceedings Index, West
Bengal State Archive (March 1907), 1; Detailed
Report of the General Committee of the Dooars
Planters Association for 1908, with Proceedings of
Annual General Meeting in 1909 [henceforth
Proceedings DPA] (Calcutta, 1911), APAC, ii.
32S.R. Christophers and C.A. Bentley, Malaria in




35Christophers and Bentley presented the
argument at the Indian Medical Congress in Bombay
in 1909. Samanta, op. cit. (note 2), 36. In his preface
to the report of the League of Nations Malaria
Commission to India, Christophers emphasised again
this aspect of malaria in industrial locations. By 1927,
the factor of the tropical aggregation of labour, or the
human factor in malarial infection was an accepted
scientific theory through reiteration in published work
on malaria in India. For instance, see Patrick Hehir,
Malaria in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1927), 45–9. The League of Nations Malaria
Committee endorsed the theory of non-immune
immigration into industrial locations as a principal
cause of malaria. See Report of the Malaria
Commission on its Study Tour in India (Aug. 23
to Dec. 28, 1929), (Geneva: League of Nations,
1930), 31.
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190In 1923, Christophers, then Director of the Malaria Bureau of India, wrote a report on
the prevalence of malarial fever in the Bengal Iron Company’s mines at Singhbhum.
36
He made similar recommendations to those he made in the Duars in 1908, such as the
screening of European bungalows, segregation, and the use of quinine as prophylaxis.
37
By this time, the concept of the tropical aggregation of labour was entrenched. Christo-
phers further refined the theory: that settled workers acquired an immunity to malaria
that was not racially inherited but acquired through repeated infections suffered by
the newly immigrant labourers and by newborn children and infants. Therefore, even
if the spleen rate of a certain area showed a high endemicity of malaria, the adult popu-
lation was not unduly affected, as they had gone through the process of acquiring
immunity through repeated malarial infections. Industrial and plantation sites with
immigrant workers acquired new significance as locations of malarial fever. The focus
on the body as the location of disease relocated the links between malaria, race, and
immunity.
Christophers and Bentley denied that race was significant in the causation of
malaria.
38 Nevertheless, in 1923, Christophers referred to certain ‘susceptible races’ –
such as the European staff and the skilled labour (mostly Hindus and Muslims). The
unskilled mine workers were ‘indigenous, largely aboriginal’ and were ‘fairly immune
to malaria’, which came after a period of ‘acute infestation’ of malaria for about two
years – a process he compared to the ‘salting of animals in trypanosomiasis’.
39 In
1926, when the Government of Bengal reported its findings on anti-malarial measures
in a tea estate in Duars, it sketched out possibilities of infection very similar to the con-
clusions reached in the mining areas of Bihar:
If a mixed population of men, women and children who were susceptible to malaria were intro-
duced into such an area, there would in the first instance be an explosive outbreak of malaria
amongst the new comers...In a vigorous race, there would be a ‘rally’ in the individual against
the parasite and gradually a tolerance or relative immunity would be developed...A time would
come when the only persons not possessing a relative immunity would be newly born children.
These would all be intensely affected and would suffer from continuous fever until they either
died or gradually acquired a relative tolerance.
40
Such a conception of immunity from malarial infection that posited distinctions
between ‘vigorous’ and other races led to the conclusion that certain communities
were more likely to acquire immunity than others: for instance, the Government of Ben-
gal report of 1926 pointed out ‘there are certainly racial differences. Santals, for instance,
seem to get immune more quickly than Nepalese, who would appear to possess small
powers of immunity production.’
41 Although there was some ambivalence about it, the
36S.R. Christophers, Enquiry on Malaria,
Blackwater Fever and Anchylostomiasis in
Singhbhum: Preliminary Investigation into the
Conditions on the Bengal Iron Company’s Mines at
Manharpur (Patna: Superintendent, Government
Printing, Bihar and Orissa, 1923).
37Ibid., 29.
38Christophers and Bentley, op. cit. (note 32), 23.
39Christophers, op. cit. (note 36), 30. See also see
S.R. Christophers, ‘The Mechanism of Immunity
against Malaria in Communities Living under
Hyper-Endemic Conditions’, Indian Journal of
Medical Research, 12 (1924) 273–94.
40Report of the Malaria Survey of the Jalpaiguri
Duars [hereafter RMSJD] (Calcutta: Bengal
Government Press, 1926), vii.
41Ibid.
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191assumption of immunity or partial immunity of certain races to malaria continued to
inform British Indian medical discourse.
42
This was different from the earlier nineteenth-century ideas of racial immunity to
fever. In the mid-nineteenth century, David Rennie, in his account of the Bhutan cam-
paign of 1865, mentioned that the Meches, the pre-colonial inhabitants of the region,
were peculiarly immune to fevers.
43 By linking racial immunity to acclimatisation in a
specific locality, Rennie conceived of immunity as both racial as well as locational.
This was a general conception among contemporary medical practitioners and colonial
ethnologists, such as E.T. Dalton.
44
This particular link between racial immunity, location, and fever became irrelevant in
the twentieth century, by which time the indigenous Meches were pushed out of the
region.
45 In the twentieth century, malaria research retained both racial and locational
categories and re-articulated them in the bodies of infected immigrant races. When
Patrick Hehir wrote Malaria in India in 1927, he emphasised that ‘dark-skinned races,
living in malarious regions, possess a relative immunity to malarial infection. This is
explicable as an acquired immunity....’
46 He quoted Koch to argue that the ‘acquired
immunity’ occurred relatively rapidly in cases where quinine was not used. This empha-
sis on acquired immunity from malaria reinforced arguments against the adoption of
more expensive quinine prophylaxis as well as anti-malarial sanitation in the plantations.
This encouraged some planters to explore ‘acquired immunity’ among the labourers.
Immunity studies in malaria, developed out of the theory of tropical aggregation of
labour, acquired economic as well as epidemiological implications in the tea plantations.
In 1927, when Ronald Ross visited Duars, the chairman of the planters’ association
wanted research on immunity to malaria: ‘I have often felt that it should be possible to
create this immunity by some artificial means and thereby hasten on what nature now
does so slowly’.
47 At the same time, the idea of the local continued to appear in multi-
farious forms. Along with the congregative body of the labourers, malariologists linked
transmission to local ecological factors.
Anti-Malarial Sanitation and
the Question of Location
At an institutional level, malaria research in India was initially conducted at the Central
Research Institute and was sponsored by the Indian Research Fund Association, (IRFA)
set up in 1911. This research was subsidised partly by the Government of India, and
42Warwick Anderson, ‘Immunities of Empire:
Race, Disease, and the New Tropical Medicine,
1900–1920’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine,7 0
(1996), 94–118.
43David Field Rennie, Bhotan and the Story of the
Dooar War (London: J. Murray, 1866), 347–8.
44See Asok Mitra, The Tribes and Castes of West
Bengal (Alipore: West Bengal Government Press,
1953), 224.
45Subhajyoti Ray, Transformations on the Bengal
Frontier (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 79. The
myth of their immunity to malaria persisted in
twentieth-century ethnographic accounts of the
Meches. See Charu Chandra Sanyal, The Meches and
the Totos: Two Sub-Himalayan Tribes of North
Bengal (Darjeeling: University of North Bengal,
1973), 7.
46Hehir, op. cit. (note 35), 39.
47Proceedings DPA, 1926, (Jalpaiguri 1927),
APAC, vii.
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192published the Indian Journal of Medical Research.
48 The IRFA also solicited private
subscription. Besides army cantonments (such as Mian Mir), anti-malarial sanitation
was attempted at mines and plantations. The success or failure of any anti-mosquito
campaign was understood with reference to local ecological conditions. The Imperial
Conference on Malaria in Shimla in 1909, led to the formation of a Central Malaria
Committee to direct the course of anti-malarial operations in different provinces.
49 At
the conference, J.T.W. Leslie, the Sanitary Commissioner, pointed out that the Drainage
Committee of Bengal had found that local ecological factors determined the extent of
malaria.
50
Officials concluded that ‘we have little exact knowledge of the distribution of malaria
in the country, of the local conditions which favour it, and of the best means to render
these causes inoperative.’
51 This concept of ‘local knowledge’ or this notion of locality
was an ambiguous scientific category: identified simultaneously with the vector, the
land, and demography. Yet, local knowledge was a powerful motif for colonial govern-
ance. In colonial India, local knowledge was both a condition and validation of rule. It
became the basis of colonial rule: in terms of the knowledge of local languages, demo-
graphy, caste, and economic geography.
52 For the colonial government, any move for
sanitary reform had to be based on ‘local knowledge’:
[We] must recognise the diversity of local conditions in a country which includes numerous com-
munities, castes and creeds and which exhibits almost every variety of climate, temperature,
humidity and level of sub-soil water, from the Deltas of Bengal with their steamy atmosphere
and dense lush vegetation to the burnt brown hills of the north-west frontier.
53
This emphasis on locality and local knowledge was such a fundamental element in
colonial administration in India that it continued to inform medical research and practice.
This administrative prerogative informed British Indian epidemiological theories, which
continued to emphasise the agency of local factors in the causation of disease. The tena-
city with which the Indian medical establishment perceived India’s disease terrain as
both distinctive and esoteric, requiring experience and familiarity to be medically under-
stood, demonstrates the persistence of the rhetoric of the ‘local’.
54 The insect-vector the-
ory and the subsequent research on malaria reinforced the idea of the importance of
‘local’ disease factors, such as the diversity in the anopheline species and the variables
in their breeding.
Medical professionals in Britain also made the link between local ecology and epi-
demics in the inter-war years. As J.A. Mendelsohn has pointed out, in the inter-war years
medical scientists working on ‘bacteriological epidemiology’ in Germany and Britain
48Mark Harrison, Public Health in British India:
Anglo-Indian Preventive Medicine, 1859–1914
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 164.
49Ibid., 297.
50Government of Bengal Proceedings, Municipal/
Sanitation, No.1–2 (March 1911), P/8686, APAC, 3.
51Government of Bengal Proceedings, Municipal/
Sanitation, No. 14–15 (July 1910), P/8419, APAC,
30.
52Tropical Medicine was one such modality of
knowing the ‘local’, see B.S. Cohn, Colonialism and
Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996),
4–5.
53‘Resolution No. 888–908, Government of India,
Education/Sanitation’, Indian Journal of Medical
Research, 1, 4, (1914), 591–2.
54Isaacs, op. cit. (note 5); Harrison, op. cit.
(note 5).
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193borrowed increasingly from older traditions of epidemiology, as well as using new math-
ematical models to formulate what he described as ‘holistic’ and ‘non-reductionist’
explanations of epidemics.
55 Helen Tilley has claimed that research on trypanosomiasis
in Africa also appropriated a complexity of variables among ecology, insect vector, para-
site, and human and animal infection in the inter-war years.
Although malaria research in colonial India both borrowed from and informed the
intellectual paradigms of malaria causation internationally, it was in some senses a par-
ticularly colonial story. The significance of local environment was a prerogative of colo-
nial rule that had informed British ideas of health, European and native bodies, and
colonial policy from the eighteenth century.
56 In the nineteenth century, this informed
the medical discourse of the anti-contagionists.
57 In colonial India, the recurring align-
ment of local factors in disease causation through divergent and multiple meanings,
including ecological factors, human agency, and the cultural practices of the disease-
stricken, had preceded the holistic medicine of inter-war Britain. The constitution of
the ‘local’ differed: it could be located in ecological, cultural, or economic factors. For
instance, in the Duars, while planters and officials emphasised the cultural and political
factors in the implementation of anti-malarial programmes, medical experts generally
focused on the heterogeneity of ecological and environmental factors. So far as malariol-
ogists were concerned, the focus of the local shifted to the ‘human factor’ following the
work of Christophers. The colonial government believed that the responsibility for the
lack of sanitary reform in India could be attributed to the ‘apathy, fatalism, and resent-
ment of interference’ of the ‘uneducated masses’.
58 Besides reinforcing the paternalism
of colonial administration, this engendered a gradualist view of sanitary reforms acquired
systematically from the knowledge of the local conditions, linking indigenous people
with topography, often used as interchangeable categories. The ‘local’ in various mani-
festations remained the paradigm for malaria research in India.
Local Ecology and the Meenglas Experiment
The multiplicity of local conditions involved in malaria control in the tea plantations was
demonstrated in the anti-malarial sanitation project at the Meenglas Tea Estate in Duars. It
was owned by the managing agency of Duncan Brothers Limited, a British company.
The funds for the Meenglas experiment were paid entirely by the Bengal provincial
government. The experiment lasted eight years, beginning in 1917.
59 The aim of the
55J. Andrew Mendelsohn, ‘From Eradication to
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World War I’, in Christopher Lawrence and George
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India, 1600–1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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194experiment was to prevent the breeding of carrier anophelines in a terrain where the land
was cut up by several seasonal streams (jhoras). In the Duars, the seasonality of the
streams depended on the terrain: for instance, the ones on the slopes remained dry for
most of the year, while the ones closer to the plains were perennial.
60 Other ecological
characteristics of the area were the proximity of jungles, rice fields, and three fast-flowing
rivers.
The area under the experiment was three-quarter-mile radius chosen carefully based
on the views of Malcolm Watson, whose successful policies in Malaya had shown that
the flight of anophelines did not exceed half a mile. However, the local factors of Duars
soon became apparent to the surveyors. The three most dangerous local carriers were
identified as A. maculatus, A. listoni and A. culicifacies. Unlike the Malayan experience,
here the anophelines that inhabited the nearby forests, principally the A. aitkeni, were
found to be harmless.
61 The experiment demonstrated that the underground drainage of
streams controlled the breeding of anophelines. It demonstrated that the spleen index
of the children and malarial fever could be reduced for a limited period within the con-
trolled area.
62
In 1925, Bentley, who was now Director of Public Health for the Government of Ben-
gal and who initiated the scheme, reported on the efficiency of sub-soil drainage in redu-
cing the death rate and the fever index.
63 However, the average overall death rate in the
tea estate did not decline during the eight years of the experiment. The spleen index
remained ‘almost static’ from 1923 to 1927.
64 The final report concluded, ‘As regards
the actual reduction of malaria, this is a point on which it is very difficult to form an
exact opinion, mostly owing to the factor of shifting population.’
65 The indifferent suc-
cess rate here highlighted the complex political, economic, and environmental factors in
anti-malarial sanitation in tea plantations.
One principal problem was the provision of free movement of labourers between
plantations. The planters retained the system of free labour because it exempted the
plantations from government regulations, such as in neighbouring Assam, where con-
tractual labour had to be examined by medical officials for fitness. The labourers liv-
ing in the bastis of the north Bengal tea gardens were used in peak times but the
management did not assume responsibility for them. The relationship between the
tea garden and the basti was one of dependence, suspicion, and even hostility. Tea pro-
duction relied on the seasonal labour from the bastis, yet every epidemic disease in
any plantation was rumoured to have originated first from the bastis. In managerial
discourse, the tea garden was the enclave that protected the health of its labourers,
as well as the pristine and primitive nature of their cultures. Yet, the economy of pro-
duction demanded a labour force that would work in the peak seasons and settle out-
side, to relieve the plantations from welfare measures for them. This paradox was
starkly in relief following the Meenglas experiment. The Duars plantations refused
to finance large-scale anti-malarial sanitation except for spending a little on spraying
60RMSJD, op. cit. (note 40), vi.
61Ibid.
62Annual Report for the Director of Public
Health, Bengal, 1920 [hereafter ARDPH], (Calcutta:
s.n., 1922), 14.
63ARDPH 1923, (Calcutta: s.n., 1925), 79.
64ARDPH 1927, (Calcutta: s.n., 1929).
65RMSJD, op. cit. (note 40), ix–x.
The Logic of Location
195kerosene in their streams.
66 These measures did not prove adequate for the control of
malaria.
67
There was a second local factor crucial to anopheline control in Meenglas: the exis-
tence of rice fields close to the plantations and often within them. Most plantations
allotted a part of their estates to the labourers where they grew rice and vegetables.
The allotments were made to labourers on the condition of work, to keep wages low.
They served as instruments of control because the labourers had no tenants’ rights
here.
68 This arrangement severely inhibited malaria control. The Meenglas report
insisted: ‘Rice cultivation should not be allowed’.
69 The contradictions of malaria control
within the plantation economy were fundamental and could not be resolved within the
existing administrative and economic structure.
There was a third dimension to this paradox. When anophelines of all varieties were
caught at the Meenglas Tea Estate it was found that the three dangerous carriers, A.
maculatus, A. minimus, and A. culcifacies inhabited the cleared and cultivated areas. A
survey of the ecology of malaria in the forested areas of Bengal revealed that forests
did not breed anopheline carriers. The clearing of forests and the introduction of tea
bushes and rice fields did away with harmless anophelines such as A. aitkeni and A. bar-
birostri, which were then replaced by the carriers.
70 Malaria was, in other words, ende-
mic to human habitation and livelihood. This conclusion, from the Meenglas experiment
and from other contemporary studies, such as those of Bentley on the links between
embankments and malaria, led to the conceptual linking of malaria with modernity and
development.
71 It also contributed to the nationalist critique of British policies in India.
72
Paddy fields were held to be the cause of malarial fever in the twentieth century, not
just in the Duars, but in most of rural India. This was emblematic of the paradoxical rela-
tionship between modernisation and malaria in India, where railways and rice fields, the
consequence of commercialised agriculture, were seen to cause the disease and yet were
impossible to obliterate from the modern Indian landscape. Bentley acknowledged the
link between rice fields and malarial fever.
73 His contribution to the debate was to imple-
ment the Italian concept of ‘bonificazione’- which according to him embodied ‘measures
designed for a double purpose, viz. to improve agriculture and improve health.’
74 This
shifted the problematic from agriculture to irrigation. In western Bengal, he advocated
anti-malarial sanitation not through drainage, but through further inundation through irri-
gation. Therefore, he avoided making a direct criticism of the development policies of
the government and instead suggested a solution that would lead to more, rather than
66Ibid., 5.
67Ibid., 49.
68Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in
India (London: H.M.S.O., 1931), 384–5.
69RMSJD, op. cit. (note 40), 48. The factor of the
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Agriculture in Bengal: How to Reduce Malaria in
Bengal by Irrigation (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat
Book Depot, 1925).
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71Bentley, op. cit. (note 69).
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malaria and development, see Sinha, op. cit. (note 2),
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196less, investment in irrigation. This strengthened the rationale of the developmental pro-
jects of the colonial government.
75 Therefore, the case for malaria control was laid to
rest with the emphasis on rice cultivation. This was ironic, for it had been the call of tro-
pical medicine to render ‘a great gift to the human race’, to penetrate impenetrable tro-
pical jungles and make them habitable.
76 Tropical medicine identified this paradox but
failed to resolve it.
Almost two decades previously, in a continuation of the acrimonious debate on the fail-
ure of the anti-malarial measures at Mian Mir, Ross had alleged both the lack of adequate
data and the faulty application of scientific knowledge in the Mian Mir operations. He
was convinced that anophelines could be destroyed in any given area, and what remained
to be accomplished was to accommodate local variables.
77 In Meenglas, the malaria sur-
veys were conducted and the entomological studies and the spleen index of labourers in
neighbouring tea estates examined. The problem here was the logistic impossibility of
extending the area under operation. The experiment at Meenglas (and a similar experi-
ment at the mining sites of Singaran and Topsi in Bengal) demonstrated that eradication
of malaria would not be possible in hyper-endemic areas.
78 The experiment confirmed
that while the idea of locality in disease control remained problematic, in administrative
terms the category of the ‘local’ assumed fresh significance. The Public Health Depart-
ment utilised the lessons of Meenglas to negate the possibility of drainage operations at
any cultivated site in the intensely malarial Lower Bengal. This marked the duality of
local factors within scientific and administrative priorities. We will next explore the sus-
tenance of this ‘local factor’ in questions of malaria control in colonial India.
Entrepreneurial Patronage and Malaria Research
In twentieth century India, medical research and the newly established institutes of pub-
lic health received financial aid from private entrepreneurs, as well as the Government.
The Calcutta School of Tropical Medicine was instituted in 1921 and was funded with
donations from the Government of India, the Bengal government and the local Indian
elite.
79 It also received subscriptions from British-dominated jute, tea, and mining indus-
tries in eastern India.
80 This patronage occasionally defined its activities. Initially the
75For criticisms by the medical establishment of
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244–79.
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197Calcutta School began research on kala azar in the tea plantations of Assam. When the
planters realised that the Government was to fund a separate research programme on the
same disease, they proposed to divert the School’s research to malaria surveys.
81 In
Assam, the total production of tea was more than two and a half times that of northern
Bengal, involving a heavier cost of labour. But the planters of north Bengal invited the
Government to aid research highlighting the ‘unique conditions’ of the region that they
believed were ideal for the study of ‘malaria and other obscure tropical diseases.’
82
They discussed funding for a research institute in the Duars, but realising that it would
cost around 35,000 to 50,000 rupees annually, opted for a more economical alternative:
a ‘malarial survey by an expert’ from the School, much like the Assam survey.
83 In 1926,
C.K. Strickland, a malariologist of the Calcutta School conducted a preliminary survey in
the Duars, as in Assam.
84 The arrangement between the Calcutta School and the Dooars
Planters’ Association resulted in several malaria surveys of Darjeeling and the Terai.
Until the advent of DDT, the tea plantations continued to be sites of malarial research,
providing ideal ‘local’ qualities for such research. Most studies located the infectivity
of anophelines in specific breeding conditions: there was some anti-malarial drainage
in one tea estate in Darjeeling.
85 Others studied comparative causes of epidemics of
malaria in hill stations, such as Shillong (Assam) and Kurseong (Darjeeling).
86 The Terai
Planters’ Association also funded a survey through the agency of the Calcutta School of
Tropical Medicine.
87
Despite obligatory visits to the ‘location’, malaria research remained unconnected with
any real action on the ground. The logic of location in malaria research was fulfilled
within the surveys undertaken in the sites. In 1926–7, when Ross visited the area, he
was invited to the annual meeting of the Duars Planters’ Association. With typical can-
dour, he pointed out the futility of endless surveys without action; ‘I now ask what does
the Dooars intend to do?’
88 He received no commitment from the planters. In his preface
to the League of Nations Malaria Commission report, Christophers conceded that anti-
malarial initiatives rarely proceeded from surveys to preventive operations in the tea
estates in India:
81Detailed Report of the General Committee of
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82Proceedings DPA, 1925 (Jalpaiguri: s.n., 1926),
APAC, ix.
83Ibid., xx; see also C. Strickland, Abridged
Report on Malaria in the Assam Tea Gardens Indian
Tea Association (Calcutta: Indian Tea Association,
1929).
84Although the anophelines of Assam were
distinct from those of Duars and Terai, common
problems included the existence of rice fields and the
cultivation of rice by plantation workers. See also C.
Strickland, ‘The Mosquito Factor in the Malaria of
Assam Tea Gardens’, Indian Medical Gazette, Vol.
60 (1925), 60.
85C. Strickland, ‘Malaria on Ambootia Tea Estate
near Kurseong and the success of some anti-malarial
operations’, Indian Medical Gazette, Vol. 59 (1924),
119–20; see also C. Strickland and H.P. Chaudhuri,
‘More on Hill Malaria’, Indian Medical Gazette, Vol.
71 (1936), 267–9.
86C. Strickland, ‘Notes on Malaria in the Hill-
Stations in or near the Eastern Himalayas’. Indian
Medical Gazette, Vol. 59 (1924), 549–50. Strickland
emphasised ‘engineering works’ over ‘personal
prophylaxis’.
87C. Strickland and K.L. Chowdhury, Blackwater
Fever and Malaria in the Darjeeling Terai (Calcutta:
n.p. 1931), 3; D.N. Roy and K.L. Chowdhury, ‘The
Parasitology of Malaria in the Darjeeling Terai’,
Indian Medical Gazette, 65 (1930), 379–80.
88Proceedings DPA, 1926 (Jalpaiguri, 1927),
APAC, xviii.
Nandini Bhattacharya
198At present, after a ‘survey’ and recommendations, nothing very much often follows, largely
because it is then left to the manager of such estate to do what he can, whereas the proper course
would be to engage a suitable man to reside on the area and see to the carrying out of whatever was
possible.
89
Why this lack of antimalarial action within the region by the planters? In administra-
tive terms, the main hindrance to the efforts on the part of the tea estates to engage in
anti-malarial operations was the ad hoc nature in which they operated and the short
term incentives involved, where the managers of the estate were personally responsible
for the finances of the tea estate. Any long-term investment in a tea estate would detract
from immediate profits and targets and thereby from the commission received by them.
Strickland pointed this out in his report while suggesting that the managers not be made
responsible for the anti-malarial sanitation work.
90
Some initiatives were undertaken from England as well. In 1930, the Ross Institute in
Putney, which was supported partly by the India Tea Association in London, opened a
branch in Shillong, in north-eastern India. However, the drainage measures undertaken
in India under the supervision of the Ross Institute were concentrated in the tea estates
of Assam, where the large managing agencies had contiguous territories and several
tea gardens under their control.
91 The Duars and Darjeeling regions remained overlooked
despite the shortage of quinine during the Second World War, which aggravated the pro-
blem of malaria in the plantations of north Bengal.
92 Mortality from ‘fever’ remained the
single largest cause of death in the plantations.
93
The emphasis on productivity and possibilities for entrepreneurial patronage did not
translate into sustained anti-malarial sanitation in the Duars and Terai plantations. Local
characteristics differentiated the Assam tea plantations from those in the Darjeeling foot-
hills. Firstly, Assam was geographically more distant from the labour recruiting districts
of western Bengal and Bihar. Recruitment of labour was expensive in Assam compared
to Duars and Terai, so it made better sense to make arrangements for the healthcare of
the working population of the Assam plantations. This did not necessarily mean welfare
of the labourers, as the Assam plantations had a darker reputation for coercion and ill-
treatment of workers by the planters and sardars and much of the funds were usurped
by them.
94
Secondly, the average acreage of tea estates in Assam was larger than in north Ben-
gal, and the gardens there were owned in contiguous territories by British managing
agencies, all of whom were members of the British-dominated Indian Tea Association.
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199In the Duars and Terai, on the other hand, the estates were smaller in size, about a
quarter of which were under Indian management. The Indian planters felt excluded
from and resented the British-dominated Indian Tea Association. They formed their
own, much smaller organisation, the Indian Tea Planters’ Association. Moreover,
several Indian planters owned jotes, tenanted agricultural land for rice cultivation
often next to the tea estates, which would have been adversely affected by antimalar-
ial drainage operations. Finally, since the tea estates in north Bengal recruited casual
basti labour, the very system depended on labourers who would cultivate rice in the
neighbouring paddy fields and work in the plantations as well. Therefore, although
public health officials and medical experts from Calcutta and London pointed
out the advantages of investment in anti-malarial sanitation, the structure of the plan-
tation economy in Duars and Terai inhibited any large-scale investment in anti-
malarial sanitation.
Conclusion:
Where Were the Tea Plantations Located?
The logic of location emerged within malaria research as an attempt to accommodate
local variability in the causation of the disease. However, this also exposed the tension
between scientific research, entrepreneurship, and local realities. The Darjeeling foot-
hills and the plains of Terai and Duars were the sites of studies in tropical medicine
conducted from London and Calcutta. These led to the identification of causation of
malaria in industrial locations all over India, with the factor of non-immune immigra-
tion and the tropical aggregation of labour. At the same time, these local sites were
exposed to the confluence of metropolitan scientific ideas. The malaria control experi-
ment that was started at the Meenglas Tea Estate borrowed from the knowledge of
anophelines and preventive measures developed by Ronald Ross (the anopheline count
per head of the population factor in infectivity) and Malcolm Watson (subsoil drai-
nage), and sought to re-examine their theses in that locality. Thus, the tracts of Duars
and Darjeeling Terai were at once connected to the entire tropical world and its dis-
eases and to the world of metropolitan and colonial tropical medicine. In doing so,
although malariologists failed to specify links between locality and disease in clear
terms, and the ambiguities of the ‘local’ in terms of ecology, demography, and race
confounded anti malarial policy, the logic of location continued to be the focus of
such surveys.
The Darjeeling foothills were not unique in this respect. Colonial realities informed,
complicated, and challenged the inadequacies of the contemporary medical theories of
the metropolis. Twentieth-century medical research is seen to have become inclusive
and holistic as it ventured from the laboratories to the field.
95 However, as this paper
has shown, within scientific research the incorporation of the problematic of location
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200or of the ‘field’ did not necessarily lead to incorporating the problems of the localities.
The prevention of malaria was also situated within this rhetoric of the local. Contempor-
ary research on conditions, such as the hospitability of the different terrains to particular
sub-species of the vector anophelines, merged seamlessly with concerns over the peculia-
rities of labouring populations within the tea plantations and outside them, at the bastis –
all framed in a set of local conditions.
The rhetoric of the local was used in two different ways. So far as the workers were
concerned, the planters generally claimed that quinine prophylaxis could not be adminis-
tered effectively because the workers were resistant to it. They also insisted that the local
government should not interfere with the management of disease within the plantations.
Instead, the ‘close’ knowledge of the labourers and their customs, and the knowledge of
local conditions that was the staple of management discourse on the tea estates (at least
until a communist-led labour movement dented it substantially after 1946), was pre-
sumed to have entitled them to be the guardians of labour welfare. The announcement
of the planters’ spokesman, W.L. Travers, after the visit of the Royal Commission on
Labour to the tea estates is representative of their gradualist and paternalist approaches
to reform in health infrastructure within the plantations:
Many of their racial and religious customs tend to impede the work of health improvement and
welfare, and therefore it is of great importance that all measures for their uplift in any direction
should be under the control and direction of persons who really know and understand the customs,
traditions and habits of these aboriginal people.
96
On the other hand, the idea of ‘species sanitation’ in tropical medicine provided a new
dimension to the colonial understanding of the ‘local’, in terms of ‘expert’ knowledge, of
the entomologists, malariologists, and parasitologists.
Yet the experts, planters, and local administrators also formed collaborations for con-
ducting malarial experiments in the plantations. The Planters Association at Duars high-
lighted the unique local conditions when asking the government to fund malaria research
in the Duars. This appeal was partly rhetorical: the planters’ associations generally
sought to shift pecuniary responsibility for any research or sanitary works to the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, the distinctiveness of the region and the knowledge of local condi-
tions gathered through colonial and managerial discourses did contribute to the
knowledge of tropical medicine.
The sub-Himalayan tea plantations were an important site of exploration for new ideas
and experimentation in methods of anopheline control. At the same time, the political
economy of the plantations highlighted a complex set of factors that inhibited both
anti-malarial sanitation as well as systematic and extensive use of quinine prophylaxis
within the tea plantations. Some European medical officers within the plantations
made isolated attempts at destruction of the anopheline breeding sites within a decade
of the discovery of the mosquitovector transmission by Ross.
97 Some managers made
similar attempts in the 1920s and 1930s.
98 However, the region itself did not experience
96Proceedings DPA 1929 (Jalpaiguri: s.n., 1930),
APAC, x.
97‘The Campaign against Malaria in the Duars’,
The Lancet, 172, 4429, (1908), 174.
98Strickland, ‘Malaria on Ambootia Tea Estate’,
op. cit. (note 85), 119–20.
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201any sustained anti-malarial measures and malaria continued to kill the labouring
population of the tea gardens. The logistics and structure of the plantation economy
could not accommodate any enduring system of malarial prevention.
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